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Abstract 
As a result of the 1973 oil embargo and the subsequent increase of world oil prices, the oil price control program took 
place in order to reduce the impact of sharply higher external oil prices. In this regard, since the domestic price for oil 
was below that of the world market, the price control effort seemed to be regarded as successful. Did the oil price 
control achieve its goal? Maybe not. This study shows that the price control for the domestically produced crude oil 
was ineffective and enhanced the ability of external suppliers to manipulate prices.
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1. Introduction 
For any society, energy is a vital element for economic growth especially since 
the Industrial Revolution. Developed countries are very dependent on nonrenewable 
natural resources such as oil and gas. With the recent spike in oil price,1 many U.S. 
consumers may recall the oil crisis in the 1970s, and call for price controls and special 
taxes on oil companies (Van Doren and Taylor, 2006). As shown in Graph 1, there were 
spikes in the world oil price in the mid and late 1970s. The U.S. imposed price control2 
on domestically produced crude oil in an attempt to lessen the impact of the 1973-74 
price increase.3 However, Van Doren and Taylor (2006) argue that the price control 
actually increased the demand for oil from foreign suppliers.4 Price control also reduced 
incentives to increase domestic production whether Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) has market power or not. 
 
Graph 1. Crude Oil Prices by Selected Type (1970-2006) 
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Source: Graph drawn from the Table 11.7 Crude Oil Prices by Selected Type, 1970-2006 at Energy 
Information Administration website. 
 
                                                          
1 Padilla (2005) states that the hike in the world oil price is due to speculation, but not due to a real shortage 
in oil supply. 
2 The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) has pronounced that “old” oil can sell for no more than $5.25 
per barrel (Economic Report of the President, 1976). 
3 The crude oil price control period extended from August 19, 1973 through January 27, 1981. Kalt (1981) 
shows that from 1974 to 1980, aggregate wealth transfers were estimated to range from $14 billion to $50 
billion annually from refiners and end-use consumers with more access to old oil to refiners and end-use 
consumers with less access to old oil. However, Kalt’s analysis assumed that world oil prices were 
unaffected by U.S. oil price control. 
4 Helbling and Turley (1975) also expected these results at the beginning the price control program. Kalt 
(1981) also argues that price controls and the incentive to import reduced the incentive to bring new 
domestic oil to market. 
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In practice, the oil price control program took place in order to cushion the 
domestic impact of sharply higher external oil prices. The price control also acted as a 
conduit to the increase U.S. reliance on foreign sources of oil supply. As indicated in 
Graph 2, the U.S. consumed approximately 14.70 million barrels per day (MBD), 
produced approximately 9.64 MBD, and imported about 1.32 MBD (9.01% are imported 
abroad) in 1970. Until the beginning of 1970s, the U.S. oil consumption relied upon a 
low level of external oil suppliers. However, in the mid 1970s, oil imports represented 
about 30-35% of total U.S. consumption. In fact, until late 1971, U.S. government 
imposed import quotas on petroleum products existed in order to prevent cheap foreign 
oil from placing domestic oil producers at a competitive disadvantage. From 1980 to 
1988, the import rate in domestic petroleum consumption began to decline, and in 1989 
reverted back to its 1978 level. In 1975, imported oil sold for $13.93, and “new” 
domestic oil 5  sold for $8.39 per barrel. Total crude oil used by domestic refiners 
consisted of about 40% “old” domestic oil,6 30% “new” domestic oil, and 30% imports. 
Then the effective domestic price (EDP) paid by domestic refiners for a barrel of oil is 
simply the weighted sum of the three prices.7 
 
Graph 2. Total Domestic Production and Foreign Import of Crude Oil 
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Source: Graph drawn from the Table 4.6 (World Petroleum Demand, 1970-2005), Table 4.1c (World Crude 
Oil Production, 1970-2005) and Table 5.3 (Petroleum Imports by Type, 1949-2005) at Energy Information 
Administration website. 
                                                          
5 Oil produced from both new wells and from old wells in excess of 1972 output. 
6 Oil produced from domestic wells not exceeding the 1972 rate of output from these wells. 
7 For instance, EDP under price control is about $8.80 ((5.25*0.4)+(8.39*0.3)+(13.93*0.3)=$8.80) and 
EDP without price control is about $11.16 ((8.39*0.5)+(13.93*0.5)=$11.16). Thus, EDP under price 
control is $2.36 cheaper than EDP without price control. 
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Williams (2005) argues that the price regulation had other effects as well. In the 
absence of price controls, U.S. exploration and production of crude oil would have been 
considerably higher. The higher prices faced by consumers would have caused lower 
rates of consumption. As a consequence, the U.S. would have been less dependent on 
imports in 1980-1981. Further, Perry (2001) argues that the economic impact of instable 
oil supply was not the only factor of an increased oil price. For instance, the crude oil 
price rose to $75 per barrel which drove gasoline prices up to $2.78 per gallon. This 
caused the nation’s bill for products of crude oil to increase by about 7% of gross 
domestic product (GDP), and the GDP to drop approximately 5%. The recent surge in 
world oil prices has given fresh impetus to call for the government to impose price 
controls on oil industry. In this regard, since the domestic price for oil is below that of the 
world market, the price control effort can be regarded as successful. Did the policy 
achieve its goal? Maybe not. To our knowledge, there is no rigorous empirical literature 
that examines whether the price control has actually succeeded in terms of its own 
purpose. This study shows that the price control for the domestically produced crude oil 
was ineffective and enhanced the ability of external suppliers to manipulate prices. 
The next section of this paper describes the basic model and data. The basic 
empirical models and testing results are given in Section II and III, and finally, Section 
IV concludes the paper. 
 
2. Model and Data 
This study attempts to test whether the price control in the 1970’s made a 
significant effect on cushioning the domestic impact of sharply higher external oil prices. 
In particular, we focus on the variations of gasoline prices related with price control on 
oil industry. In order to examine the speed at which gasoline price rises faster between 
price controlled and non-controlled crude oil prices, a reduced-form empirical model is 
set up by driving supply and demand of the gasoline consumption, and by extracting the 
reduced form equation on the price of gasoline. For each market, the market supply 
function ( )•stQ  gives the quantity of oil that price-taking firms would offer at time t, 
while the market demand function ( )•dtQ  gives the quantity of oil that price-taking 
consumers would purchase at time t, both as functions of gasoline price. When the 
markets are clear, for all markets, the gasoline price (pg) acts to equate supply and 
demand: 
 ( ) ( )ttdtttst xpgQxpgQ ;; =        (1) 
  
where, x denote a vector of covariates characterizing the market. At time t, we can only 
observe the equilibrium gasoline price pgt, the equilibrium quantity Qt and the covariates 
xt, but cannot observe either the supply or demand function. In this study, we assume 
linear types8 of demand and supply functions for simplicity.9  
                                                          
8 See Angrist et al. (2000) for the consequences of relaxing both the linearity and additivity assumptions. 
9 Model for the petroleum supply is generally linear model. The linear model is the model of choice in the 
petroleum industry because of given certain production and transportation constraints (EIA, 2003). Linear 
models are estimated with both level and log variables (Table 1). 
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Supply side of the oil products are as follow:10 
 
s
tttt
s
t PRODPCPGQ εαααα ++++= 4321      (2) 
 
where Qs = quantity produced, PG = price of gasoline, PC = price of crude oil, PROD = 
crude oil well productivity and sε  = error term. 
Demand side of the oil products are as follow:11 
 
d
ttt
d
t GNEPGQ εβββ +++= 321       (3) 
 
where, Qd = quantity consumed, PG = price of gasoline, GNE = gross national 
expenditure12 and dε = error term. By solving the structural equations (2) and (3) for the 
gasoline price and quantity as functions of the covariates, we obtain the following 
reduced-form equations for the linear oil market model:13  
 
141312111 ttttt vGNEPRODPCPG ++++= ππππ     (4) 
 
As explained above, in order to see the price regulation effects, dummy variable 
by considering the different events that occurred in the U.S. oil market is added in the 
model. Further, we create price regulation and crude oil price interaction dummy variable 
to see the effect of the interact variable on the gasoline price under regulation and that is 
not controlled. Finally, we add refining capacity and capacity utilization variables to 
control for variation in the refining market over time and as an indicator of scarcity in the 
refining process into the baseline model. Thus, we construct variety of different sets of 
models as follows; 
 
2142322212 ttttt vREGdGNEPRODPCPG +++++= ππππ    (5) 
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10 The determinant for the oil supply is price, refinancing capacity and regional effect (EIA, 2003). We use 
price and productivity of the oil for simplicity. Later, however, we add refinancing capacity and capacity 
utilization in order to capture the possible effects of the oil supply. 
11 The determinant for the oil demand is price, real income level and demand for crude oil in the previous 
period (EIA, 2003). We do not include previous demand for the crude oil to avoid the collinearity problem. 
12 GNE is a total of all types of expenditures within the economy (public and private). We use this variable 
as an income measurement instead of GDP since it is different from GDP because expenditures on imports 
are included, but exports (goods produced within the economy but sold outside of it) are not. 
13 The order condition states that the number of variables (exogenous and endogenous) excluded (restricted) 
from any of the equations in the model must be at least the number of endogenous variables minus one. The 
rank condition states that a necessary and sufficient condition for the identifiability of the first equation is 
that the rank of Aφ1 (φ1 is a column vector whose hth element) must be at least equal to the number of 
endogenous variables minus one. According to the procedure just described, we conclude that the system of 
equation is identified. 
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where, REG = price regulation dummy, RC = refining capacity, UC = capacity utilization 
PDC = price of domestic crude oil and PIC = price of imported crude oil. Most of the 
events did not affect the regime except for the regulation phases for price control 
conducted by President Nixon in 1973 and the deregulation in 1981 conducted by 
President Reagan.14  From equation (5) to equation (8) are standard dummy variable 
regression analysis to isolate the effects of the price control by considering intercept 
change and slope changes. If the price of gasoline rises at a faster rate with the price 
control than without the price control, the dummy variables, ds, would be positive. 
In this empirical analysis of the price of gasoline, we obtained the data from the 
standard source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) website and data set spanning 
the years 1973-2004.15 For the quantity produced/consumed and price of gasoline,16 we 
used U.S. petroleum consumption (million barrels) 17  and real retail gasoline price, 
respectively.18 For the control variables, we used data on the following: price of crude oil 
(real composite refiner acquisition cost), 19  crude oil well productivity (average 
productivity; barrels per well) 20  and gross national expenditure (percent of GDP). 21 
Finally, we constructed this dummy variable by considering the different events that 
occurred in the U.S. oil market; d = 1 when the price control occurred (from 1973 to 
1981) and 0 otherwise. 
  
3. Empirical Results 
The baseline models, equation (5) and (6) are given in Table 1. The first and third 
columns show the result of the baseline model with price control dummy variable, and 
third and forth columns show the result of the baseline model with price control dummy 
and interaction dummy variables. Table 1 shows that the coefficient for the crude oil well 
productivity exhibits a small positive number that is statistically significant for most of 
the cases (both level22 and log). However, gross national expenditure does not have a 
significant effect on gas prices for all of the cases since the coefficient for the variable 
                                                          
14 The Carter Administration began a phased decontrol of oil prices and they were finally dismantled in 
1981 under Reagan Administration. 
15 Yearly data is used since most monthly data available from 1980s. Further, even though there was more 
available data from earlier years, we exclude these prior to 1973 since the object of this study is examining 
the rate of change for gasoline prices during and after the price control, and data sets include the latest 
available data. 
16 Obtained from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/fsheets/petroleumprices.xls. 
17  Data is available until 2003 for the quantity produced/consumed variable. Obtained from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb1110.html. 
18 Obtained from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/contents.html. 
19  The composite cost was derived by weighting domestic costs and imported costs on the basis of 
quantities produced and imported (PDC is refiner acquisition costs for domestic oil and PIC is refiner 
acquisition costs for imported oil). 
20 Through 1976, average productivity is based on the average number of producing wells. Beginning in 
1977, average productivity is based on the number of wells producing at end of year. 
21 Obtained from World Bank (World Development Indicators). 
22 The coefficient associated to the productivity is nearly zero in the baseline case. Thus, interpretations of 
such small numbers are ambiguous. 
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shows a small negative number. However, the number that is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels implies that gas price is not dependent on national income level.23 For 
the price control on crude oil, the result for the dummy variable in Equation (5) is 
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels (Columns (i) and (iii) of Table 
1). However, coefficients of the interactive terms for the price control and crude price in 
column (ii) and (iv) in Table 1 are not statistically significant. These results indicate that 
gas price increased in every level of crude oil prices during the price control period, but 
the effect of crude oil on the gas price was not changed due to the price control. That 
means, price control on crude oil was ineffective but it resulted in the opposite effect of 
what policy expected. In addition, the effect of crude oil price on gas price was 
independent from whether or not the price control took place. 
 
Table 1. Test Results for the Price Control 
 Baseline Natural Log 
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Price of Crude Oil 3.11** 3.26** 0.46** 0.50** 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) 
Crude Oil Well Productivity 9.4e-09* 7.9E-09 0.21** 0.16* 
 (3.6e-09) (3.6e-09) (0.07) (0.08) 
Gross National Expenditure -1.56 -1.65 -0.98 -1.17 
 (1.08) (1.09) (0.84) (0.82) 
Regulation 26.31** 32.33** 0.14** 0.42* 
 (3.22) (8.09) (0.02) (0.17) 
Regulation Interact with Price of Crude Oil Price  -0.19  -0.08 
  (0.12)  (0.05) 
Constant 219.32 229.63 3.53 5.46 
  (112.93) (114.39) (4.66) (4.64) 
R2 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 
Ramsey RESET test 3.77** 3.58* 2.03 7.71** 
Breusch-Pagan test 7.35** 6.96** 0.00 0.23 
Durbin-Watson d 2.14 2.19 1.38 1.59 
Breusch-Godfrey 0.44 0.55 0.86 0.45 
Jarque Bera Test† 7.55 8.1 6.33 6.57 
 (0.67) (0.78) (0.79) (0.88) 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. * and ** denote significant t-value at 5 and 1% levels, respectively. † p-
value in parentheses. We can notice that the Durbin-Watson test statistics associated to equations (5) and 
(6), written in log, are in somehow low (smaller than 2): 1.38 and 1.59, respectively. Thus, the residuals in 
log-equations may be autocorrelated. 
 
In addition, since the total oil supply is made up of domestic and imported crude 
oil, we composite these two groups in order to see whether domestic or imported crude 
oil causes a sharp increase in domestic retail gas price. Table 2 provides the estimated 
results. In particular, the interaction dummies with domestic crude oil are significantly 
negative but the interaction dummies with foreign crude oil are significantly positive in 
column (ii), (iii), (v) and (vi) in Table 2. These results show that the spike in domestic gas 
price came mainly from imported crude oil price increases. This increase may have 
                                                          
23 Gately and Huntington (2001) show that the income elasticity of oil demand is 0.31 and is ranged from 
0.72 to 0.84 for the OECD and non-OECD countries, respectively. 
 6
resulted from a significant decrease in the production of domestic crude oil. These 
findings are not in line with the expected policy proposals. In other words, even though 
the U.S. government enforced the oil price control program to reduce the impact of 
sharply higher external oil prices, it led to higher dependence on imported crude oil and 
the gas price rose at a faster rate under the price control period than non-price control 
period. 
 
Table 2. Test Results for the Extended Model 
 Level Natural Log 
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Price of Crude Oil 3.41**   0.42**   
 (0.33)   (0.05)   
Price of Domestic 
Crude Oil  3.99** 4.25**  0.90** 0.98** 
  (0.67) (0.63)  (0.16) (0.13) 
Price of Imported 
Crude Oil  -0.64 -1.09  -0.37* -0.53** 
  (0.60) (0.63)  (0.15) (0.13) 
Crude Oil Well 
Productivity 4.3E-9 9.9E-9** -1.1E-9 -0.06 0.21** -0.06 
 (7.6E-9) (2.9E-9) (5.8E-9) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09) 
Gross National 
Expenditure -0.86 -2.26* -1.20 -0.48 -1.79* -0.92 
 (1.29) (0.84) (0.89) (0.86) (0.67) (0.60) 
Refining Capacity -7.1E-9  4.0E-9 0.41  0.34 
 (9.0E-9)  (6.5E-9) (0.27)  (0.21) 
Capacity Utilization -2.1E-9  -1.5E-8 -0.64*  -0.78** 
 (1.0E-8)  (8.2E-9) (0.27)  (0.22) 
Regulation 31.80** 33.83** 43.99** 0.54** 0.30** 0.39** 
 (10.86) (5.25) (7.37) (0.18) (0.05) (0.05) 
Regulation Interact 
with Price of Crude 
Oil Price -0.09   -0.1   
 (0.25)   (0.05)   
Regulation Interact 
with Price of 
Domestic Crude Oil 
Price  -0.07** -0.09**  -0.02** -0.02** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.00)  
Regulation Interact 
Price of Imported 
Crude Oil Price  0.06** 0.08**  0. 02* 0.02** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant 208.34 283.19** 263.31** 12.41 7.08 19.10** 
  -116.02 -87.05 -81.16 -6.7 -3.72 -4.78 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 
Ramsey RESET 
test 9.19** 1.12 3.21* 6.63** 3.26** 2.59 
Breusch-Pagan test 
(Heteroskedasticity) 8.63** 0.01 0.09 0.62 0.08 0.24 
Durbin-Watson d 2.52 2.04 2.71 2.17 1.50 2.25 
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Breusch-Godfrey 6.07* 0.06 4.62* 1.37 2.20 0.57 
Jarque Bera Test† 12.78 4.99 52.43 12.19 11.60  
 (0.69) (1.00) 0.00  (0.73) (0.77)  
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. * and ** denote significant t-value at 5 and 1% levels, respectively. † p-
value in parentheses. 
 
Each equation, we conduct Ramsey (for a specification error), Breusch-Pagan 
(heteroskedasticity), Durbin-Watson (autocorrelation), Breusch-Godfrey (cross-
correlation) and Jarque Bera (normality) tests. Each test statistic is evaluated at the 5% 
significance level. The basic sensitivity analysis test results for the baseline model 
(Equation 4) are provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Estimation Sensitivity Analysis (Baseline Model) 
Variable Test Statistics Probability 
Chow Test 1.88* 0.16 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 14.30** 0.00 
Durbin’s Alternative 22.28** 0.00 
Durbin-Watson d 0.62  
Breusch-Pagan (Heteroskedasticity) 1.47** 0.23 
Mean VIF 1.52  
Notes: * and ** denote F and Chi square test statistics, respectively. 
 
In addition, according to the plot of residuals versus fitted values, the plots show 
all species of possible problems. Since there is a clear upward trend in the first two 
variables (price of crude oil and crude oil well productivity) and downward trend in the 
last variable (gross national expenditure), the model specification is quite well fit (shown 
in Graph 3). 
 
Graph 3. Plot of Residuals versus Fitted Values (Baseline Model Variables) 
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4. Conclusions 
The recent surge in world oil prices has given fresh impetus to call for the 
government to impose price controls on oil industry. In particular, many U.S. consumers 
remember the oil shock and the resulting price controls that were set in the 1970s. The 
question, then, is whether or not the price control policy achieved its goal. In other words, 
the question is whether the price controlled market price under regulation tends to rise at 
a slower rate than the price that is not controlled. However, the empirical analysis 
presented in this study points out that in the U.S., under price regulation; gasoline price is 
more responsive to changes in crude oil prices than under deregulation. This study also 
shows that crude price and crude oil well productivity have a positive relationship to gas 
price. Yet, income level, refining capacity and capacity utilization do not have a 
significant effect on gas price. 
Historically, gas prices have fluctuated over time, and current price level has risen 
to an unparalleled point and is remaining steady. Since price control can be levied only in 
U.S. companies, such policy also increases the economic attractiveness of foreign relative 
to domestic oil. The intended purpose of the price regulation was to reduce domestic oil 
price from the higher world oil price. Yet the empirical analysis shows that the price 
regulation on domestic crude oil was in conflict with its stated purpose. More importantly, 
price controls provided both disincentives to produce oil domestically and incentives to 
import oil. As imported oil became increasing proportion of total domestic consumption, 
the effective domestic prices of oil became higher which resulted in the opposite 
direction from the original policy objective. Eventually, the price controls affected the 
supply side of U.S. market and aggravated the degree of inefficiency of allocation of 
resources between domestic oil production and foreign oil. The increase in the prices of 
foreign oil passed-through to the U.S. market more increasingly with price control than 
price decontrol.  For the oil price spike, there is no unique resolution to such a 
multifaceted problem, but much can be done toward its resolution.24 
The effective domestic price of oil will increase as a portion of the imported oil is 
increased in the total domestic consumption. Further, greater reliance on foreign supply 
sequentially enhances the vulnerability of the domestic oil price and which results in 
reduction of domestic oil production. The oil prices would increase at a slower rate as a 
result of decontrol; incentives for both increased domestic production and reduced 
imports are provided. Increased domestic production and reduced imports, in turn, would 
lessen the dependence of domestic oil consumption on foreign suppliers, and hence, be 
conducive to lower domestic prices for oil in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Dinan and Austin (2002) suggest three policy options order to reduce gasoline consumption; increasing 
the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards that govern passenger vehicles, raising the federal 
tax on gasoline, and setting a limit on carbon emissions from gasoline combustion and requiring gasoline 
producers to hold allowances for those emissions (a policy known as a cap-and-trade program). 
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